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There are many limitations when using file hashes to 
identify known content. Because changing just a single 
bit of a file changes its hash, pornographers, malware au-
thors, and other miscreants can evade detection simply by 
changing a comma to a period or appending a few random 
bytes to a file. Likewise, hash-based identification will not 
work if sections of the file are damaged or otherwise un-
recoverable. This is especially a problem when large video 
files are deleted and the operating system reuses a few 
sectors for other purposes: most of the video is still present 
on the drive, but recovered video segments will not appear 
in a database of file hashes.
SECTOR HASHING
We are developing alternative systems for detecting 
target files in large disk images using cryptographic hashes 
on sectors of data rather than entire files. Modern file sys-
tems align the start of most files with the beginning of a 
disk sector. Thus, when a megabyte-sized video is stored on 
a modern hard drive, the first 4 kibibytes are stored in one 
disk sector, the second 4 KiBytes are stored in another disk 
sector, typically the adjacent one, and so on. (In our work, 
we distinguish between power-of-two-based sizes of digital 
artifacts, such as kibibytes, and power-of-ten-based sizes, 
such as kilobytes. See the “Decimal versus Binary Prefixes” 
sidebar for more details.) Furthermore, by sampling ran-
domly chosen sectors from the drive, it is only necessary 
to read a tiny fraction of the drive to determine with high 
probability if a target file is present. This enables rapid triage 
of drive images.  
We compare drive sector hashes to a hash database of 
fixed-sized file fragments, which we call blocks. The terms 
“sector” and “block” are often used incorrectly as syn-
F orensic examiners frequently search disk drives, cell phones, and even network flows to determine if specific known content is present. For example, a corporate security officer might examine a sus-
picious employee’s laptop for unauthorized documents; 
law enforcement officers might search a suspect’s home 
computer for illegal pornography; and network analysts 
might reconstruct Transmission Control Protocol streams 
to determine if malware was downloaded. In these and 
many other cases, examiners typically identify files by 
computing their cryptographic hash—often with MD5 or 
SHA1 hash algorithms—and then searching a database for 
the resulting hash value. 
Use of hash values for file identification is pervasive 
in digital forensics—every popular forensics pack-
age has built-in support. One of the most widely used 
databases is the National Software Reference Library 
(NSRL) Reference Data Set (RDS). Version 2.36, released 
in March 2012, contains 25,892,924 distinct file hashes 
(www.nsrl.nist.gov). Other databases are available to 
customers of specific companies and to law enforcement 
organizations.
Using an alternative approach to traditional 
file hashing, digital forensic investigators 
can hash individually sampled subject 
drives on sector boundaries and then 
check these hashes against a prebuilt da-
tabase, making it possible to process raw 
media without reference to the underlying 
file system. 
Joel Young, Kristina Foster, and Simson Garfinkel, Naval Postgraduate School
Kevin Fairbanks, Johns Hopkins University
Distinct 
Sector Hashes 
for Target File 
Detection
Disclaimer
The opinions expressed herein are those of the author(s), and are 
not necessarily representative of those of the Naval Postgraduate 
School, the Department of Defense (DOD); or, the United States 
Army, Navy, or Air Force. 
The author has no financial interest in any of the products or 
technologies described in this presentation.
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My research focus: better tools and algorithms for triage.
Identification of high-value data.




—Temporal / time sequence?
Correlation — are there copies of the same or similar information?
• Identify previously unknown organizations or networks
• Identify data that is unusual or emerging
Presentation and Integration:
• Make the results understandable.
• Effect organizational change through adoption & integration
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Email addresses are typical “features”
of forensic interest.
    Email addresses can be compressed.
    Popular forensic tools do not optimistically
    decompress.
! Our study of 1400 drives found
! thousands of email addresses
! that were only in compressed data.
Today’s tools frequently miss case-critical data.
7
It’s so hard that none of the commercial or open source 
digital forensic will show these email addresses.
13
e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......




This may be a serious problem.






























Email addresses can reveal:
• User(s) of a device
• Associates
• Connections between devices 
• Today’s forensic tools implement two strategies for extracting email addresses.
1.Text extraction from files
2.Text extraction from bulk data









1. Text extraction from files:









COM TEXT TEXT  
TEXT TEXT
➼
2. Text extraction from bulk data:






a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+
d89d 77cc fe1e f637 f3f3 d0af 1b47 c09b  ..w....7.....G..
It’s easy to see email addresses in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+






Every email address is a sequence of bytes.
A simple email address:
XYZ@company.com
Stored on disk / in memory as 15 bytes:
X  Y  Z  @  c   o   m   p  a   n   y  .  c   o   m
Each byte is 8-bits. Range is 0-255
88 89 90 64 99 111 109 112 97 110 121 46 99 111 109
Normally bytes are displayed in hexadecimal notation:
58 59 5a 40 63  6f  6d  70 61  6e  79 2e 63  6f 6d
This is UNICODE
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Every email address is a sequence of bytes.
A simple email address:
XYZ@company.com
Stored on disk / in memory as 15 bytes:
X  Y  Z  @  c   o   m   p  a   n   y  .  c   o   m
Each byte is 8-bits. Range is 0-255
88 89 90 64 99 111 109 112 97 110 121 46 99 111 109
Normally bytes are displayed in hexadecimal notation:
58 59 5a 40 63  6f  6d  70 61  6e  79 2e 63  6f 6d
This is UNICODE
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Byte sequences can be encoded in many ways.
XYZ@company.com
• Unicode: “XYZ@company.com” 
58 59 5a 40 63 6f 6d 70 61 6e 79 2e 63 6f 6d
• Base 16: “58595a40636f6d70616e792e636f6d0a”
3538 3539 3561 3430 3633 3666 3664 3730  58595a40636f6d70
3631 3665 3739 3265 3633 3666 3664 3061  616e792e636f6d0a
• Base 64: “WFlaQGNvbXBhbnkuY29tCg===”
5746 6c61 5147 4e76 6258 4268 626e 6b75  WFlaQGNvbXBhbnku
5932 3974 4367 3d3d 3d0a                 Y29tCg===.
• Compression: echo “XYZ@company.com” | compress | xxd
1f9d 9058 b268 0132 e64d 1b38 61dc e471  ...X.h.2.M.8a..q
51b0 8d02                                Q...
13
Compression works by eliminating repeated sequences:
Computers use compression to save memory:
5859 5a40 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  XYZ@company.com 
4142 4340 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  ABC@company.com 
4445 4640 636f 6d70 616e 792e 636f 6d20  DEF@company.com
Compressed with “gzip:”
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000            7.>..U..0...
Compressed email addresses do not “look” like email addresses!
—Forensic tools must decompress FIRST to identify compressed email 
addresses.
14
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......
0a8e 4ece 287c 1757 3714 3e00 a175 10ed  ..N.(|.W7.>..u..
Mother.JPG
It’s hard to see compressed email address in bulk data.
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a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......





It’s so hard that none of the commercial digital forensic 
will show these email addresses.
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e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......




This is a serious problem.
How big is the problem?




































Some may be in both files and in non-files.









We can use a Venn Diagram to represent email 



























































There are four different conditions for an email address 
on the media.
Condition #4 is invisible

























We devised an experiment to determine the size of 
condition #4 for a specific drive.






























































































bulk_extractor is an experimental email extraction tool.
“Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,” 
Simson L. Garfinkel, Computers and Security 32 (2013) 56-72






“Feature files” contain the extracted email addresses.
Plain text features have numeric offsets:  
392175418








392175418    WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com   Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com\015\012
...
3772517888-GZIP-28322  user@company.com  onterey-<nobr>user@company.com</nobr>
...





























Post-processing with identify_files.py reveals file names
Offset:  392175418  
Feature: WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
Context:!\012[User]\015\012Name=WindowsXP@gn.microsoft.com
         \015\012Password=B@ji0
Filename:WINDOWS/system32/oobe/migx25a.dun 
MD5:     2b00042f7481c7b056c4b410d28f33cf      








bulk_extractor 1.3.2 recognizes a wide variety of features 
and encoding types:
Feature types:
- Domain Names; Email addresses; URLs, CCNs
- Search terms; Facebook IDs; JSON data
- KML files; EXIF data
- VCARDs
- word search output
- PCAP files; Ethernet Addresses; TCP/IP Connections; etc.
- ELF & PE headers; Windows Prefetch files
Encoding Types:
- ZIP; GZIP; Windows Hibernation 
- BASE16, BASE64
35
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff       476 Jul  7 23:50 aes_keys.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 alerts.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      2743 Jul  7 23:59 ccn.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff       454 Jul  8 00:03 ccn_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 ccn_track2.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  8 00:03 ccn_track2_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  23369167 Jul  8 00:03 domain.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    185266 Jul  8 00:03 domain_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 elf.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   1719842 Jul  8 00:03 email.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     35073 Jul  8 00:03 email_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     23961 Jul  8 00:00 ether.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff       337 Jul  8 00:03 ether_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  11188830 Jul  8 00:03 exif.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 find.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      1112 Jul  8 00:01 gps.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 hex.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     95835 Jul  8 00:03 ip.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     11603 Jul  8 00:03 ip_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   2025702 Jul  8 00:03 json.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 kml.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    194991 Jul  8 00:03 packets.pcap
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     21343 Jul  8 00:03 report.xml
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   3782598 Jul  8 00:03 rfc822.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    213746 Jul  8 00:03 tcp.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     61255 Jul  8 00:03 tcp_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff     59469 Jul  8 00:03 telephone.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      6612 Jul  8 00:03 telephone_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  67205326 Jul  8 00:03 url.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  8 00:03 url_facebook-id.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   5706665 Jul  8 00:03 url_histogram.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  8 00:03 url_microsoft-live.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff      8504 Jul  8 00:03 url_searches.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff    151673 Jul  8 00:03 url_services.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff         0 Jul  7 23:48 vcard.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  18549729 Jul  8 00:03 windirs.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  29051041 Jul  8 00:03 winpe.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff   1984759 Jul  8 00:03 winprefetch.txt
-rw-r--r--@ 1 simsong  staff  34128889 Jul  8 00:03 zip.txt
This drive contains a GZIP stream in a Windows Hibernation File.
• JSON object downloaded from Facebook by compressed HTTP
• In RAM, written to HIBER on disk when the system went into sleep.
Some drives have a lot of compressed data
36
...
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-1526   groups-noreply@linkedin.com   3d\134"groups-noreply@linkedin.com
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2018   m*****************@gmail.com  3d\134"m*****************@gmail.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2128   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2625   *******.consultancy@gmail.com 3d\134"*******.consultancy@gmail.c
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-2736   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3186   san****@***********.com       \134" "san****@***********.com\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-3685   Careers@******bank.com        3d\134"Careers@******bank.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4124   par****@team******.com        3d\134"par****@team******.com\134"
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4149   u003epar****@team******.com   \134u003epar****@team******.com\13
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4607   d****.*****@gmail.com         3d\134"d****.*****@gmail.com\134"\
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-4631   u003ed****.*****@gmail.com    \134u003ed****.*****@gmail.com\134
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5114   raj******@bsnl.in             3d\134"raj******@bsnl.in\134"\134u
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5558   kiran.***@****technology.com  3d\134"kiran.***@****technology.co
…6464-HIBER-49691-GZIP-5671   sur*******1@gmail.com         3d\134"sur*******1@gmail.com\134"\
...
135 out of 5700 email addresses are invisible to existing tools.







Cleartext 358 -- 5341 --
All Comp -- 9 -- 135
GZIP 50 13 1 22 14
HIBER 39 6 1 27 5
HIBER-GZIP 23 21 2
PDF 88 1 9 78
ZIP 28 2 5 3 18
ZIP-PDF 18 18
We ran bulk_extractor and identify_filenames.py on 
drive IN10-0138 and examined the email encodings:
37
Many of these email addresses are significant
Example email addresses (sanitized)
Questions:
• How common are compressed email addresses in unallocated space?
• Is this technique worth the effort?
38
Encoding  Email Address (*Sanitized)        Note
========  ==========================        ====
GZIP      ****@*****.dk                     PII
ZIP       ******@desktopsidebar.com         PII
HIBER     ntIV@std.do                       false positive
ZIP       ****************@digital.com      source code?
ZIP       pcg@goof.com                      ECGS Compiler
ZIP       andrew@northwindtraders.com       MS Office Sample
ZIP       ActiveSh@eet.Na                   false positive
GZIP      linux-ntfs-dev@lists.sourceforge.net  mailing list
Analysis of 1,646 disk images
(Including email addresses present in cleartext)
39
Coding               Drives    Emails   avg     max     σ
---------------------------------------------------------
(CLEARTEXT)             949 2,043,168 2,152 178,073 8,890
ZIP                     426    86,259   202  59,369 2,887
GZIP                    261    79,351   304   9,111 1,035
GZIP-GZIP                17    12,676   745  11,845 2,778
PDF                     186     2,569    13     238    30
HIBER                    85     1,481    17     220    43
ZIP-ZIP                  74       470     6      48     8
ZIP-GZIP                 18       307    17     132    31
BASE64                   56       250     4      50     7
ZIP-PDF                  28       125     4      18     4
ZIP-BASE64-GZIP           2        65    32      38     5
BASE64-GZIP               2        65    32      38     5
GZIP-GZIP-GZIP            4        58    14      38    14
GZIP-ZIP                  7        54     7      30     9
GZIP-BASE64               7        44     6      11     3
GZIP-PDF                  5        38     7      30    11
GZIP-GZIP-BASE64          2        38    19      30    11
ZIP-BASE64                5        30     6      13     5
GZIP-GZIP-ZIP             1        12    12      12     0
ZIP-ZIP-ZIP               4        10     2       6     2
HIBER-GZIP                1         2     2       2     0
BASE64-GZIP-GZIP          2         2     1       1     0
ZIP-BASE64-GZIP-GZIP      2         2     1       1     0
ZIP-ZIP-PDF               1         1     1       1     0


























































Analysis of 1,646 disk images
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• Conclusion: This is a big deal!  Lots of email addresses are being missed.
Coding                                 Drives    Emails   avg     max     σ
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
1) Plain in files                         739    81,920   110   4,206   253
2) Comp in files                          355    19,711    55   5,454   388
3) Plain in non-files                     860 1,956,059 2,274 178,073 9,248
4) Comp in non-files                      474   165,481   349  59,376 2,889
          BASE64 Comp                      54       219     4      50     7
          BASE64-GZIP Comp                  2        64    32      37     5
          GZIP Comp                       234    66,195   282   9,103   981
          GZIP-BASE64 Comp                  7        44     6      11     3
          GZIP-GZIP Comp                   15    12,663   844  11,845 2,944
          GZIP-GZIP-BASE64 Comp             2        38    19      30    11
          GZIP-GZIP-GZIP Comp               4        58    14      38    14
          GZIP-GZIP-ZIP Comp                1        12    12      12     0
        GZIP-PDF Comp                     5        38     7      30    11
          GZIP-ZIP Comp                     6        49     8      30     9
          HIBER Comp                       79     1,433    18     217    44
          PDF Comp                        162     2,352    14     238    31
          ZIP Comp                        388    85,252   219  59,369 3,025
          ZIP-BASE64 Comp                   5        30     6      13     5
          ZIP-BASE64-GZIP Comp              2        65    32      38     5
         ZIP-GZIP Comp                    14       261    18     132    34
         ZIP-PDF Comp                     26       115     4      18     4
Some drives have more than TEN THOUSAND email 
addresses that are compressed and not in a file.
41
a097 83a1 ed96 26a6 3c69 3d0f 750a 2399  ......&.<i=.u.#.
a2b5 bea7 692f 5847 a38a dd53 082c add5  ....i/XG...S.,..
5061 b64c 721d 864b 90b6 b55f bb04 735c  Pa.Lr..K..._..s\
9448 6730 5453 df64 813e b603 5795 2242  .Hg0TS.d.>..W."B
e9c8 7454 7322 7cdc b60e 97af 2f64 2728  ..tTs"|...../d'(
3cfb 84bd 2a84 2dfe 50ea 5935 c349 1513  <XYZ@COMPANY.COM
a9e9 e92c a3f8 6e46 0530 8a88 c7a2 5d2b  ...,..nF.0....]+




e327 962d 6450 3d91 c945 3bed 97a6 a4cd  .'.-dP=..E;.....
1f8b 0800 0000 0000 0203 8b88 8c72 48ce  .............rH.
cf2d 48cc abd4 03d2 0a8e 4ece 287c 1757  .-H.......N.(|.W
3714 3e00 b455 c1c5 3000 0000 0000 0000  7.>..U..0.......





(Compressed email in files are also ignored...)
“Digital media triage with bulk data analysis and bulk_extractor,” 
Simson L. Garfinkel, Computers and Security 32 (2013) 56-72
42
computer systems, purchased at second-hand computer
stores, in open-air markets, and other venues, frequently
contain information left from their former users. As a result,
the data from used computer systems can be productively
used as a surrogate for digital media acquired during the
course of law enforcement operations. Information collected
on the secondary market in this fashion has the advantage of
being usable in research, as it does not contain law-
enforcement sensitive information, provided that sufficient
privacy controls are in place. This study further confirms
those research findings.
To gauge the age of each drive, the Date: headers in email
messages found on the disks were also extracted with
bulk_extractor. The date of each disks’ last activity was
computed by averaging the five most recent timestamps.
Visual inspection of a randomly chosen sample confirmed
that the extracted timestamps did in fact correspond to
actual times.
Email addresses present on more than a single drive were
discarded. The remaining addresses were tabulated according
to whether each email address appeared in plaintext or in
a compressed stream. There were 865 drives that contained
email addresses, of which 431 also contained timestamps.
Table 5 presents, for each year, the number of drives recov-
ered for that year, the total number of email addresses, the
number of email addresses encoded with each compression
algorithm, and the number of email addresses only present on
a single drive.
As shown, therearea significantnumberof email addresses
that can only be recovered by optimistically decompressing
forensic data, demonstrating once again that the recall
performance of forensic tools can be significantly improved
through the use of optimistic decompression.
Table 4 e Email addresses were stored in sample documents using specific applications. The documents were copied into
a disk image. The resulting image was analyzed separately with strings and grep, EnCase, and bulk_extractor. This table
shows which email addresses could be recovered.
email address Application (encoding) strings & grep EnCase BE
plain_text@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (UTF-8) ✔ ✔ ✔
plain_text_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
rtf_text@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (RTF) ✔ ✔ ✔
rtf_text_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
plain_utf16@textedit.com Apple TextEdit (UTF-16) ✔ ✔
plain_utf16_pdf@textedit.com Apple TextEdit print-to-PDF (/FlateDecode) ✔
pages@iwork09.com Apple Pages ‘09 ✔ ✔ ✔
pages_comment@iwork09.com Apple Pages (comment) ’09 ✔
keynote@iwork09.com Apple Keynote ’09 ✔
keynote_comment@iwork09.com Apple Keynote ’09 (comment) ✔
numbers@iwork09.com Apple Numbers ’09 ✔
numbers_comment@iwork09.com Apple Numbers ’09 (comment) ✔
user_doc@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (.doc file) ✔ ✔ ✔
user_doc_pdf@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) print-to-PDF
user_docx@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (.docx file) ✔
user_docx_pdf@microsoftword.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) print-to-PDF (.docx file)
xls_cell@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔ ✔ ✔
xls_comment@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔
xlsx_cell@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) ✔
xlsx_cell_comment@microsoft_excel.com Microsoft Word 2008 (Mac) (Comment) ✔
doc_within_doc@document.com Microsoft Word 2007 (OLE .doc file within .doc) ✔ ✔ ✔
docx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft Word 2007 (OLE .doc file within .doc) ✔ ✔ ✔
ppt_within_doc@document.com Microsoft PowerPoint and Word 2007 (OLE .ppt
file within .doc)
✔ ✔ ✔
pptx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft PowerPoint and Word 2007 (OLE .pptx
file within .docx)
✔
xls_within_doc@document.com Microsoft Excel and Word 2007 (OLE .xls file
within .doc)
✔ ✔ ✔
xlsx_within_docx@document.com Microsoft Excel and Word 2007 (OLE .xlsx file
within .docx)
✔
email_in_zip@zipfile1.com text file within ZIP ✔
email_in_zip_zip@zipfile2.com ZIP’ed text file, ZIP’ed ✔
email_in_gzip@gzipfile.com text file within gzip ✔
email_in_gzip_gzip@gzipfile.com gzip’ed text file, gzip’ed ✔
Fig. 6 e An inflated stream from a PDF file created using
Apple’s TextEdit application. The original document
contained the string “plain_text_pdf@textedit.com”. Notice
that the email address is preserved in the output.
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21 out of 30 compressed email addresses in test files were ignored.
There are many sources of compressed data.
Today’s tools ignore these data when not in files.
Documents:
• Microsoft Office (.docx, .xlsx, .pptx); PDF files (text is compressed)
• Browser Cache (downloads are compressed)
Archives:
• ZIP files; GZIP (GZ) files
System Resources:
• Hibernation files & file fragments
If forensic examiners miss an email address:
• A perpetrator or an accomplice may not be identified
• Media may not be associated with a crime
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In summary: Compressed emails in non-file space are 
being systematically ignored. It’s a serious problem.
Important, relevant data is hidden by today’s tools.
I demonstrated the extent of the problem with:
• bulk_extractor, a high-performance stream-based feature extractor




• Real Data Corpus:
—http://digitalcorpora.org/
44
...those that remain are the “invisible” email addresses.
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